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The point of departure for this article about anti-communism in 
the American Labor Movement is the internal conflict in the 
Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) , which in 1949-50 
resulted in the expulsion of 11 pro-communist labor unions from 
this organization. 
I have picked out this event because I consider it decisive in 
several ways for the consecutive development of the American 
labor movement in general and the CIO in particular. The CIO 
changed important aspects of its structure and political profile in 
the period from 1935-50. From being a relatively democratic 
membership-controlled organization established in conscious oppo- 
sition to the anti-communist bureaucratic trade union structure of 
the AFL, the @IO, by 1950, had become an organization which did 
not differ substantially in any important respects from its original 
antagonist: strongly centralized, vehemently anti-communist, 
integrated with the federal political administration, in support of 
the democratic labor and industrial policy as well as the Cold War 
policies of the Truman administration. 
CIO's expulsion of these pro-communist unions was not an event 
to radically change the character of the American labor movement 
at one blow, but should rather be considered as an indication that 
the development outlined above had been accomplished. 
A short introduction to the literature on anti-communism 
Only a very small part of the extensive historical literature about the 
American Communist Party (CP) and its impact on American 
society deals with the American Labor Movement. And this in 
spite of the fact that communist influence in this sector was not just 
make-believe but an established fact. The literature one does find, 
however, falls into two phases belonging to two different periods of 
history. One phase belongs to the late '50s, the Cold War, immedi- 
ately after McCarthyYs downfall and the time when the American 
CP, as a result of the anti-communist hysteria among other things, 
had been reduced to an impotent and unimportant small political 
sect. Two major works from this period, Kampelman, The CP us the 
CIO from 1957, and David Saposs, Communism in American Unions 
from 1959, both explain the influence of the CP in American labor 
unions as the result of the clever application of the communists's 
extensive organizational and manipulative abilities in a socially 
instable period - the depression ol the '30s, They implicitly assume 
that the American communists are foreign infiltrators and inter- 
venors - an Unamerican element - a conception which is contra- 
dicted by the fact that the ethnic composition of American com- 
munists was, by and large, similar to that of the remainder of the 
American population. Even in the '30s, when the party gained its 
largest iniluence and growth of membership, this new membership 
was predominantly white middle class. 
The expulsion of the communists is thus explained in the context 
of the alleged fundamental difference between the undemocratic 
practice of the communists and the democratic character of the 
American labor movement and healthy American ideology - it 
was the lack of ability of American communists to adapt themselves 
to this democratic line of thought which constituted the background 
to the expulsions. 
An important premise to this idea is a typically Cold War 
dramatization of the role of the American CP as a representative of 
the Soviet Union. A notion which, in part, may be justified, as the 
party was politically dependent on the Soviet Union (more specifi- 
cally on the Comintern) - a dependency which during the Cold War 
was bound to be considered traitorous. 
Concerning the ethnic composition of American communists it 
was by and large similar to the one of the remainder of the American 
population. And in the '30s when the party gained its largest in- 
fluence and growth of membership this new influx was primarily 
white middle c1ass.l 
Vis-8-vis this political right-wing criticism of the CP, we find a 
group of New Left historians representing the second phase, among 
others James Green and Nelson Lichtenstein, who in a 1975 issue of 
the Radical America have analysed the relationship between the 
CP and the labor movement. Their political interest has been one 
common to many New Left historians, to prove the existence of a 
militant or socialist tradition in the American working class. 
They express a political critique of the lack of ability of the CP to 
take the lead in the working class militancy that existed during the 
war and was flourishing in the post war years. They consider this a 
major negligence and an important reason why no socialist alternative 
was put forward in the politically turbulent period from 1945-48. 
This critique is essentially a critique of the Popular Front tactic of 
the CP which forced the communists to withhold their "private" 
political views from the public and formed an important obstacle to 
an open political mobilization. 
Peter Losche, the German historian, influenced by marxist 
theory, must also be considered a contributor to this tradition. In  
his book, Ir~dustriegewerkschaften im organisierten Kapitalismus from 
1974, he explains the success of the CP in the CIO, in spite of its 
explicit loyalty to the Soviet Union, as a result of a coalescence of 
the interests of the Soviet Union and the American working class 
till 1941. He concludes, however, that anti-communism in the CIO 
is irrational because the policies of the CP in this period coalesce 
with those of the right-wing of the CIO. Thus, he does not find 
objective (even though ideological) reasons for the right-wing 
opposition to the influence of the CP. 
This theme, the causes of anti-communism in American labor, 
is dealt with in a fascinating way in one of the latest works in the 
field by the former union organizer Bert Cochran in Communism and 
Labor from 1977. Perhaps because he draws on a wealth of personal 
experience and conversations with then active labor union members, 
he succeeds in refuting many of the dogmas of the Cold War 
historical tradition (even though he himself is probably part of this 
tradition, ideologically). What makes him more useful than most 
non-marxist historians is his critical attitude to the leading strata of 
the trade union bureaucracy. He considers the bureaucratization 
and uniformity of the '40s an almost inevitable and automatic 
development in the process of "maturing" of any organization, and 
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tradition, ideologically). What makes him more useful than most 
non-marxist historians is his critical attitude to the leading strata of 
the trade union bureaucracy. He considers the bureaucratization 
and uniformity of the '40s an almost inevitable and automatic 
development in the process of "maturing" of any organization, and 
consequently he considers the expulsion of the communists a 
necessary means of ridding the organization of a radical opposition 
group. The problem remains, however (apart from the fact that the 
theory of the necessity of bureaucratization is disputable), that the 
communists themselves actively contributed to this development. 
An examination of their labor policy does not expose them as a 
radical opposition group. The communists did not per se form an 
obstacle to the above-mentioned organizational and structural 
change of the CIO. 
As these considerations may suggest, the conflict that developed 
within the CIO on the Communist issue is not a simple one. I t  is 
no pure and simple conflict between a right and a left wing. Neither 
is it an obvious conflict between a democratically inclined rank and 
file (the American equivalent of the European left) and a bureau- 
cratic CIO leadership aiming at  centralizing the organization ~ 
(which was the outcome in the '50s). I t  is not until the consequences 
of the outcome oi: the conflict become visible that such concepts - 
right - left, rank and file - top bureaucracy - gain their validity. 
The outcome of the expulsions was, as suggested above, that the 
CIO was centralized and bureaucratized and that local democratic 
as well as left-wing initiatives were impeded substantially. But such 
concepts are not useful when it comes to explaining the actual 
development of the conflict. 
Therefore, in this treatment of anti-communism in the American 
labor movement, I have found it appropriate to consider the 
function of anti-communism in the CIO. As the communists neither 
formed a democratic nor a revolutionary tendency in the CIO mhjv 
was their expulsion necessary? Why were they expelled at this 
particular time and how had the expulsions become possible? i.e. 
how could the internal power relationships have changed so 
considerably since the late '30s when even the CIO leadership was 
dependent on the assistance of the  communist^?^ The purge within 
the labor movement's own ranks must be seen in tlze context of the 
major changes of the domestic as well as the international scene 
after the termination of the war. The expulsions, therefore, should 
be considered both as an internal strife between contesting factions 
within the labor movement and a struggle conditioned by outside 
political and economical factors of both national and international 
dimensions. 
Some basic remarks 012 the nature qf the conflicts in the CIO and the CP 
In  order to understand the course of events it is important to see 
the CIO and the CP as contradicting entities containing opposite 
internal tendencies with regard to both structure and political 
practise. Where the CIO is concerned, we find a decisive internal 
contradiction from the very conception of the organization: be- 
tween the newly organized industrial workers' spontaneously 
democratic demands and autonomous self-organized forms of 
action, and the wish of certain G I 0  leaders to create an organiza- 
tion, centralized and controlled by themselves, in order to form a 
counterweight to the AFL. 
I t  is a misconception to believe that the CIO was the pure and 
untainted expression of the unskilled, unorganized industrial 
workers' will to struggle. Several younger historians (e.g. Mike 
Davis3 and Piven and Cloward4) have observed that the labor 
leaders, whom traditional history presents as the heroes of the 
labor movement (John Lewis of the United Mine Workers may be 
the most obvious example), were not initiators of the early struggles 
of the '30s. At a time when labor militancy was surging in the mass 
producing industries, these leaders were intensely involved in 
conflicts within the old AFL bureaucracy, conElicts which were not 
the cause but an effect of the then already existing mass movement 
in the working class. Mike Davis puts it this way, 
The original CIO was an alliance of dissident trade union bureaucrats with 
important financial resources and friends in high places, created for the purpose 
of capturing an already existent mass movement of industrial shop committees 
and rebel locals - a movement with dangerous embryonic proclivities toward an 
anti-Gompersian model of class struggle unionism.5 
The development of the CIO in this period is the result, at  least 
on one level, of the contradiction between a locally organized mass 
protest movement and a group of top bureaucrats trying to gain 
control of the new organization - not necessarily to further their 
own interests, but to give this organization a political perspective 
which was in line with the labor tradition they themselves repre- 
sented. This control of the CIO was obtained with the assistance of 
the American communists, without whom top leaders such as 
Lewis and Hillman6 could not have consolidated their power in the 
workers' mass movement. I shall return to this important aspect of 
the internal conflict later. 
The American Commurzist Party was, like all western national 
communist parties, an organization with a double purpose. I t  was 
not just an ordinary left-wing organization representing the 
interests of the American working class (as for instance the PWW or 
the SPA). The very specific position of the CPUSA was rooted in 
its ties to the Third International, whose primary purpose was to 
further the interests of the Soviet Union on a world-wide basis. 
As long as these two purposes did not conflict with each other, 
the CPUSA did not distinguish itself substantially from other left- 
wing organizations in its political and labor activities. But in 
certain important phases of the period in question the two purposes 
did conflict, and in these instances Soviet interests were given 
priority to the building of a socialist movement in the USA, with 
the result that the interests of the American working class were 
disregarded. The history of the CPUSA in the '40s will fully 
illustrate this.' 
In 1919, the American communists had left the small Socialist 
Party (SPA) and, until the Great Depression, had led a relatively 
quiet life without any considerable popular support. I n  the '20s 
the party had followed a vacillating labor policy with the long-term 
purpose of strengthening the labor organization of the American 
working class in industrial ~ n i o n s . ~  
The altered conditions of class struggle brought about by the 
economic crisis of the '30s resulted in substantial progress for the 
party, in regard to both. electoral support and increased member- 
ship. In  spite of all tactically determined vacillations in its policy, 
the party secured for itself a tremendous success in the '30s because 
of its determined and aggressive defense of the material interests of 
the working class against capitalists, tenement owners and official 
authorities. 
When fascism began to gather strength in Europe, the American 
CP, like all other communist parties, embarked on the Popular 
Front policy. I n  the USA this took the form of support for Roose- 
velt's New Deal and the Democratic Party. American communists 
now worked in a host 01 politically broad front organizations and 
for the first time in its history won general recognition with tlie 
American public. The party emphasized its patriotism ("Com- 
munism is twentieth century Americanism") and stressed its 
ideological rapport with national American heroes like Jefferson, 
Jackson, Lincoln, and Paine.lo The membership of the party rose 
from 40,000 in 1936 to 75,000 in 1938. The majority of these were 
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at all and distinguished themselves func 
strikes of the '30s' both in regard to the i 
the demands that were put forward.27 
instances where militant local "Inddustri 
couple of wild cat strikes in various cit 
strikes effectively by recalling the auto 
well as their local democratically elected 
cause of communist i n f i l t r a t i ~ n . ~ ~  
Often these councils were controlled 1: 
an important part in the political work I 
of the Executive Board to restrict the aut 
an indication of how the increasing co 
down into the CIO and was exploitec 
forces here. What is more important, ho 
zational restrictions decided to limit the 
actually had severe consequences for lot, 
xatic political control of all local 
t of locals to freely decide with which 
wanted to cooperate and thus had 
:xplicit intention of limiting the com- 
~ e d  rapidly after the war. Following 
; was controlled by a conservative 
ti-labor Taft-Hartley bill was passed. 
tined strength of employers and anti- 
moved the results won by the working 
he '30s. One, for our purpose, very 
the ruling that all labor leaders must 
at they were not members of the CP 
policies in their capacity of labor 
ed out sympathy strikes, secondary 
I types of picketing, as well as renew- 
ruling against union contributions to 
-esolutions had a great impact on the 
lternal CIO conflicts about the com- 
,tantial cleavage within the organiza- 
ct most effectively. 
bor movement against this act, which 
communists but on the labor move- 
re and failed because of internal dis- 
fact that the AFL named the act a 
rl it bordered on fascism, jurisdictional 
ganizations from reaching agreements 
)osed. 
ited front would have been decisive, 
both organizations' fear of losing thcir 
'hus, the whole labor movement be- 
as the act intended. One important 
y to create such an opposition was 
federal a d m i n i ~ t r a t i o n . ~ ~  This de- 
ad consciously accepted and contri- 
Act and onward, now revealed its 
being able to resist it. Another reason 
mists and anti-conlmunists. 
Consequences of the Act 
As mentioned above, the Taft-Hartley 
the established interests of the labor mover 
in putting a halt to all further organii 
Southern states, the largest unorganized 
by tlie extensive organizing campaigns 
Hartley Act provided tlie strongly anti-lal: 
possibility of legally weakening the labor 
closed shop through so called "right to wo 
of organization in the USA dropped fro 
years.31 
Several thousand labor olficials signed 1 
that they were not communists and stren! 
in  the labor movement so effectively th: 
communists or those merely suspected of 1: 
everyday events. The pro-communist unic 
militant profile (and therefore suspect€ 
found themselves in an extremely diffici 
employers had obtained legal sanction to r 
tracts. A general deterioration of wages an 
approaching in all sectors where unioniza 
The legislative attempts of the right-v 
movement had given the anti-comrnuni: 
opportunities. The internal witchhunt of c 
well as the political regimentation net 
loyalty to Truman's Cold War policy. I 
political attitude to foreign policy, in 
Plan and the presidential election in 194E 
showdown for the communists in the CIC 
Around 1948, the political situation 
Large liberal and labor groups bore stro 
man's domestic policy, his weak stance or 
his continuously interventionist foreign pc 
T o  carry out the Marshall Plan would r 
omic margin of domestic social reform at 
money into military purposes. Henry Wall; 
and conciliatory disposition towards the So 
to a large spectrum of groups from con 
crats, and a potential threat to the effect1 
War policy, as he represented some of thc 
thered momentum towards the end 
ber 1947, Wallace announced his 
e Citizens' Association) and in the 
r popular support than anyone had 
ition appeared to be very difficult. 
minimal after the Dixiecrats had 
European Recovery Programme in 
lgress seemed doubtiul. 
a result of growing tension between 
e increasing reflections cast on the 
f a well publicized anti-communist 
. l l a ~ e . ~ ~  This mudslinging crusade 
lallace campaign and alienating the 
;ressives from the third party.s3 
t led to a passionate sharpening of 
dership had systematically moved 
man's policies and remained con- 
1 was the only possibility of having 
.34 Towards the end of 1947, CIO 
ndorsed the Marshall Plan, and 
1s that did not loyally adhere to this 
ciplinary measures. The communist 
1 understandable opposition to the 
conflicts within the CIO to unfold 
hese political issues. This rampant 
must not only be regarded as an 
.hance to get rid of the communists 
unity and strength of the organiza- 
be CIO. By endorsing Wallace, the 
ie unity which they had endeavored 
inging to CIO president ~ u r i a ~ ' s  
and enduring innumerable anti- 
r year. By doing so they lost the last 
the CIO because their strength in 
5. As mentioned above, the Re- 
xed  their congressional majority to 
by passing the Taft-Hartley Act, 
hreatening perspectives. If the G I 0  
)n of a democratic president (and 
IS only possible if the CIO stood 
united), it  would greatly improve the ( 
tion with the democratic administrati 
portant ingredient in CIO's political 
former communist labor officials dt 
alleged attempt to split the CIO. T l i ~  
Transport Workers Union, stated: "If 
the CIO, the price is too great. . . . 1' 
With this statement he was probably 
majority of American labor. 
The remarkably low turnout for W; 
ingly remarkable landslide in Truman's 
unequivocal expression of American 
identification with the Democratic Par 
of the election prove that the communis 
party which would not have been able t 
different political context. Most decisivc 
communist hysteria and the ensuing p~ 
very few dared associate themselves wit1 
communist participation. 
The Expulsions 
The scruples and doubts which mar 
about passing constitutional amendmei 
from membership had faded away by l! 
at the Cleveland convention the majorit 
Two unions were expelled at  the con1 
expelled the following year as a result 
CI0.36 The expulsions and ensuing decic 
of the CIO entirely. The CIO now introc 
ing that all locals support the official CI' 
domestic issues. The executive board oj 
dictatorial powers to watch the activitie 
these in cases where they did not comr 
CLO. The CIO had come to represent a 
centralization which had been unthinka 
years earlier. 
With regard to membership figures, 
from the expulsions during the first J 
members. A large portion of these ret 
lged local elections in the respective 
established new unions to rival the 
ard time surviving the unfavorable 
Act. Only a very strong union could 
s of the NERB and the mounting 
.ogressive unions made an existence 
~creasingly difficult. To illustrate the 
ti-communist campaign in the labor 
hat in 1954 60 percent of all American 
nti-communist stand by constitution- 
n mernber~hip.~' 
perspectives concerning the important 
le Democratic Party (renewed at the 
I would probably not have been able 
rt). By expelling the communists the 
discrediting opposition group and at 
self from any further discussion of 
the Truman administration. CIO had 
:d status as ally and social partner of 
. by organized opposition within its 
idea that CIQ's development towards 
rm organization in close collaboration 
was intimately connected with the 
und the CIO communists. One might 
communists and anti-communists in a 
~f the GIO, as suggested above. With- 
mmunist victory over the communists 
unists was identical with this develop- 
ver, necessary prerequisites. 
between the various factions in the 
I, it is impossible to find any explicit 
ms of a contradiction between demo- 
file groups wanting to centralize the 
munist unions were often strongly 
:d by a Stalinist orthodoxy which 
-communist unions. The communists 
~f more democratic conditions in the 
unions. O n  the contrary, in several case; 
buted actively to a centralization which, 
turned out to be a boomerang against ther 
to centralize power in the hands of the e 
vated by the "communist danger" in the u 
of the organizational constrictions took pla 
expulsions or in the immediate context of 
Even though i t  is not possible to contt 
represented a democratic tendency in the 4 
was to some extent a guarantee against ce 
regimentation, precisely because the don 
to check and counterbalance each other 
fractions were permanently dependent on 
and file to gain ultimate power. 
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